A B-52 CIRCLING across afghanistan is loaded with Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM).

A B-52 CIRCLING across afghanistan is loaded with Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM). Its ship's company receives the coordinates of Taliban military positions from an Air Force controller operating upon the ground as part of a special operations forces (SOF) team. The B-52 releases the precision-guided bomb that hit with pinpoint accuracy and decimate--one by dint of one--the Taliban positions. This impressive display of air-power demonstrates the flexibility and all-weather capability of Global Positioning rule (GPS) munitions--a capability that has justifiably captured the imagination of airpower enthusiasts. Still, a gnawing question remains: What mission is the B-52 performing? This attack in succession enemy fielded forces is best seasoned direct. attack and does not fit neatly into the description of either the finish air support (GAS) mission or the air interdiction (AI) mission as defined from current Air Force counterland doctrine. (1)

In the latter air operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, US airpower has been enlist in one's serviceed against enemy armies independent of friendly land operations. Yet the Air Force doctrinal description of to what extent it fights does not think this reality of modern combat. Traditional thinking haves steadfast to the supporting character of airpower in counterland operations. Until the Air Force acknowledges the direct attack of fielded forces as a counterland mission and assumes the responsibilities of this character it will continue to have difficulty in organizing, training, and equipping for the task.

The relevance of counterland operations should be addressed before examining specific air operations against fielded forces. one USAF strategic airpower theorists argue that the targeting of fielded forces is of marginal importance. (2) These theorists note that since World War II, principally of the Air Force force arrangement and doctrine had been disentangleed to counter the modern, industrialized nations of the Warsaw Pact. nevertheless they fail to recognize that US airpower has been primarily occupyed against underdeveloped, authoritarian states. so states have been controlled by way of leaders reliant on the backing of the military as their primary source of power and as an instrument of their ambition. The United States has take pleasure ined the advantage of air superiority athwart these small states, which have not been able to afford and train a late and sophisticated air force. (3) They employ instead to their conventional armies, ranging from large armored divisions to small clumps of lightly armed militia, to provide as well-as; not only-but also; not only-but; not alone-but internal and external security. Airpower's ability to attack like armies is a significant contribution to the defeat of these states.

Combat operations in Kuwait, Kosovo and Afghanistan have highlighted the importance of direct attack. besides Air Force counterland doctrine has not adequately addressed these operations. The doctrine's fundamental flaw continues to be the assumption of simultaneous air and land operations. Today, counterland airpower operations are classified as either CAS or Al missions. (4) While GAS deals specifically with air operations in the cease proximity of friendly ground companys and requires detailed coordination, Al engages the enemy before it reaches the battlefield. According to Air Force doctrine, Al is occupyed "to destroy, disrupt, divert, or delay the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces." (5) as well-as; not only-but also; not only-but; not alone-but the GAS and Al definitions assume that friendly earth forces exist and are involved in succession the battlefield.

History does not support the underlying assumption of simultaneous air and land operations. From Normandy to Afghanistan, airpower has typically been used prior to the introduction of territory forces. The routine choice to enlist in one's service airpower first could be explained from its greater mobility, the flow of political considerations, or simply unimpaired military planning. Early Air Corps doctrine advocated a period of time, prior to the engagement of earth troops, in which airpower would attack various targets, including enemy territory forces. (6) Current Air Force doctrine, however, does not adequately address the use of airpower to attack enemy field forces in the absence of friendly land forces. When required to do to such a degree the Air Force finds itself ill prepared and must take an ad hoc approach to like key tasks as overall command and repress of the batt1espace (7) and target identification and prioritization.

Airpower's Historical Support of Counterland Operations

This article has discussed the passing from hand to hand counterland doctrine of AL and GAS, and will now turn the thoughts at how airpower has actually been give employment toed The objective is to reveal shortcomings in common Air Force thinking and doctrine and to commit changes to improve the employ of airpower in the direct attack of a fielded army.

World Wars I and II

The support of earth operations has been a primary part of airpower since its inception. In World War I, Royal Air Force (RAP) bombers inadvertently introduced aerial interdiction. They had been unable to locate their primary targets and instead attacked German railheads in France; in in the same manner doing, they disrupted the stream of equipment and supplies to the German brass (8) In the three month leading to D day in World War II, the RAP and Eighth Air Force redirected their energies from strategic bombing to a sustained air interdiction operation against the German transportation hypothesis in France. (9) Gen George s Patton and his Third Army relied heavily upon GAS sorties from the fighter-bombers of the Ninth Air Force to puncture their way across France. Patton placed experienced pilots in his lead tanks, using radios to command strikes. Likewise, in the Pacific, GAS prov to be a solution element in the amphibious operations of the island-hopping campaign. In fact, the air attacks at Rabaul were in like manner effective that it was de em unnecessary to launch domain operations at all.