Mao's Generals Remember Korea edited and translated according to Xiaobing Li.

Mao's Generals Remember Korea edited and translated according to Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millett, and Bin Yu University Pres of Kansas (http://www.kansaspress.ku.edu), 2501 West 15th way Lawrence, Kansas 66049-3905, 2001, 344 pages, $3995 (hardcover).

Napoleon wrote "In war common sees his own troubles and not those of the enemy." Military historians frequently have trouble analyzing and presenting the plans, actions, and difficulties clashed by both sides in post--World War II conflicts. In a cases, this occurs because of language barriers; it takes years to expand the linguistic skills necessary to find out subtle nuances that often characterize military matters that, by the agency of their nature, are jealously guarded on commanders and governments. Obtaining records instants another challenge to those who search for to write about both sides of new conflicts. Even when authors acquire the language skills and gain access to political and military archives, they may find that participants have carefully shaped their accounts to place their actions in the best light, thereby making historical interpretation difficult. In Mao's Generals Remember Korea, three eminent scholars provide the same of the best compilations of high-level Chinese recollections of the "Forgotten War."

couple excellent essays, an introduction by the agency of the editors, and an essay entitled "What China Learned from Its 'Forgotten War' in Korea" by way of Bin Yu introduce the generals and place their memoirs in historical adjoining matter Chinese leaders celebrate the Korean War as a significant victory against "imperialist" encroachment on the United States and its allies. Despite this attitude toward the war, these leaders intervened reluctantly--only after the Soviet Union refused to provide effective support to Kim Jong Il's North Korean forces and after United Nations (UN) forces advanced toward the Yalu River following the fortunate Inchon landing in the fall of 1950

Mao's guidance attempted to manipulate international opinion against the UN effort according to characterizing the conflict as the "War to Resist America and Aid Korea" and at labeling Chinese forces that fought in Korea as "volunteers" The Chinese People's tender Force (CPVF) ultimately grew to include 3 million soldiers, of which more than one-third would become casualties of the war. Chinese strategic objectives focused first forward saving Korea and second upon preserving Chinese independence (p. 32) Although Mao's forces had defeated the Nationalists, they were ill prepared to fight an expeditionary war against a coalition of recent industrial states. Chinese leaders learned that their army urgencyed to emphasize "professionalism, the part of firepower, land] improving logistics capability" if it were to contend effectively (p. 24).

The brief memoir of Marshal Peng Dehuxi, the top Chinese military leader during the war, reveals the link between Chinese grand strategy and theater operational plans. Peng clearly understood the limits placed forward Chinese forces by inferior equipment and inadequate logistical methods He divides the war into five campaigns that provide the constitution for the recollections of the remaining commanders' memoirs. After realizing that pushing UN forces not upon the peninsula would involve unacceptable materiel and political losse Peng and his collaborators opt for a protracted war strategy in which actions in succession the battlefield were designed to influence negotiations. This is the picture of the Korean War after 1951 that haunts in the greatest degree Western accounts of the conflict.

Marshal Nie Rongzhen, who serv as chief of the People's Liberation Army General Staff during the war, focuses forward the decision to intervene forward the Korean peninsula. Although tinged with Communist dogma, his account reveals the difficulty that the strategic situation created for China: "If the American imperialists' piece of ground had been allowed to succe in Korea, they would have forced us to have a showdown with them forward another battleground [in China]. We could have been pushed into a passive situation. China could not ever have been what it is today" (p 43) Thus, rather than being a spot on the national strategic consciousness during the hyemal War, Chinese perspectives on the Korean War contemplate a nationalistic battle that preclud inevitable aggression from an imperialist foe

Lt Gen Du Ping, who directed political mobilization during the war, l efforts to place the Korean intervention in accurate ideological context for the companys and their commanders. He serv as a vital link between political leaders in Beijing and the operational staff that designed the various campaigns. This political effort required [i]troupe[/i] indoctrination, concern for morale, propaganda aimed at friendly and enemy audiences, and conclude coordination with official negotiation teams. Initiatives of the like kind as a soldier's newspaper, patriotic lays and poems, and memorials to fallen heroes connected support among the CPVF for seeing the war to a victorious conclusion.

No amount of operational planning or political mobilization could rise above the disadvantage that plagued the CPVF in the area of combat logistics. Gen Hong Xuezhi, responsible for organizing logistics for the CPVF candidly recalls that he tried to refuse this work at jobs because of its daunting challenges. Many CPVF soldiers went into battle with antiquated weapons--or none at all. As Marshal Xu Xiangquian notes the Soviets were slow in fulfilling their promises of materiel aid; flat when such aid was forthcoming, Chinese leaders set up themselves saddled with cast-off weapons from World War II rather than the of recent origin ones they expected. General Hong vieed with poor transportation infrastructure within China, a overturned road-and-railway network in Korea, and incessant air attacks between the Yalu and frontline Chinese multitudes All the memoirs in this work include comments on the import of UN air superiority in succession CPVF prospects for sustaining and exploiting offensives. Moreover, as time wore onward coordination between UN air forces and field artillery effectively debared CPVF and North Korean units from achieving campaign objectives.