according to Michael B.

according to Michael B. Oren. Oxford University Pres (http://www.oup-usa.org), 198 Madison Avenue, recently made known York, New York 10016, 2002 480 pages, $3000

Michael Oren has written what will undoubtedly be a required subject on the Arab-Israeli wars in general and the Six-Day Way of 1967 in particular. Many tribe think of the latter conflict in names of the lightning air strike the Israelis actionsed as an opening gambit to the taught situation in the Middle East. Oren takes readers beyond this perspective and into the squeezings on the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Israeli sides regarding making a decision to engage in war. He appropriate s one chapter to each day of the exert one's self from 5 to 10 June 1967 describing the tactics, counterstrikes, and crowd exhaustion on a]l three brows The author a]so pieces together the political conditions that l to Israel's spectacular victory. Unlike many Israeli writers who focus in succession Israel's triumph, he delves into the suitableness of the Jordanian Arab Legion and the aftermath of the victory in succession Arab psychology, which contributed to a coordinated surprise attack forward Israel by Egypt and Syria in succession 6 October 1973--the beginning of the Yom Kippur Way.

Part of the part reveals the strange relationship between Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and Abd al-Hakim Amer, his commander in chief. Egypt's strongman tolerated Amer's corruption, superintended his dismal performance in the Yemen War (1962-67) and refused to acknowledge by what mode he had ruined the union between Syria and Egypt Amer had step quickly the Egyptian armed forces as his personal fiefdom, appointing officers not forward the basis of military means of independence but on their entertainment value and loyalty to him. The eventuate was an officer corps distant from the bodys it commanded. One of the lock openers to Israeli success lay in Amer's indecisiveness forward the eve of battle, issuing counterorders and completely ignoring battle plans drawn up according to the general chiefs of staff. Nasser and his generals placed too plenteous faith in their Soviet arms and not enough in the training, morale, and logistical support of the basic Egyptian fighting soldier.

Oren also digs into the enormous pressure felt by way of Israeli prime minister Levi Eshkol and his generals, l through Itzhak Rabin and Moshe Dayan, to contrary Egyptian and Syrian mobilizations and military bravado. Nasser had expell United Nations regarders from the demilitarized zone imposed through the Suez crisis of 1956 dispatched his navy to blockade the Straits of Tiran, and initiated a program to divert the headwaters of the Jordan River to Israel's disadvantage. This self-same readable book has my highest recommendation.

Lt Comdr Youssef H Aboul-Enein, MSC USN

Washington, D C

...

Home