In August 1941 four men all former instructors at the Air Corps Tactical exercise (ACTS) at Maxwell Field.

In August 1941 four men all former instructors at the Air Corps Tactical exercise (ACTS) at Maxwell Field, Alabama, reported to the Air War Plans Division (AWPD) in Washington, DC to lay the foundation for a comprehensive, strategic air war plan. Lt Col Hal George called relating to Maj Laurence Kuter, Maj view Walker, and Maj Haywood s Hansell Jr. to answer a entreaty from President Franklin D. Roosevelt for a "production plan to defeat our enemies"--one that would outline specific air requirements for industrial mobilization should the United States become embroiled in a war. After nine days, the team delivered a briefing to Gen Henry Arnold and Gen George C Marshall that specified production requirements for 13083 bombers; 8775 fighters; 2043 observation and photographic aircraft; 2560 transports; and 37051 trainers--an astounding total of 63512 aircraft. Although these numbers were impressive, the planners surpassed Roosevelt's tasking by recommending a strategy for prosecuting the war against the Axis p owers. That strategy assumed that airpower could achieve strategic and political objectives in a fundamentally strange way.

Building concerning untested airpower theories (taught over the 1930s at ACTS) that relied on the subject of self-defending, high-altitude daylight bombers, the team first envisioned a strategic defensive in the Pacific theater while prosecuting an all-out air war against Germany. Air forces would concentrate for 18 month before launching an intensive six-month air campaign against Nazi Germany. The forces that had assembled at bases in Great Britain would focus onward industrial target systems--the "industrial web"--that supported the German war effort. Electrical power, rail and canal transportation, rock oil production, and other industries formed the backbone of any industrial power. The AWPD staff also recognized that the German Luftwaffe would high hill a strong defense. Consequently, the enemy air force became an 'intermediate objective of overriding priority." Allied strategists later incorporated constituents of AWPD-1 into AWPD-42 and the plans for the Combined Bomber Offensive that commanders used to arraign the air wa r against Germany.

To Learn More...

Biddle, Tami Davis. Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Pres 2002

Cate, James Lea, and E Kathleen Williams. "The Air Corps Prepares for War, 1939-41" In The Army Air Forces in World War II. Vol 1 Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942 Edited through Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Gate. 1948 of recent origin imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983

Faber, Lt Cal Peter R "Interwar US Army Aviation and the Air Corps Tactical School: Incubators of American Airpower." In The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory. Edited by dint of Cal Phillip S. Meilinger. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Pres 1997

Hansell, Haywood s Jr. The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler, Atlanta, Ga.: Higgins-McArthur/Longino & Porter, 1972

Murray, Williamson. "Strategic Bombing: The British, American, and German Experiences." In Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Edited by means of Williamson Murray and Allan R Millett Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres 1996

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