Victory smiles on the subject of those who anticipate the changes in the character of war.

Victory smiles on the subject of those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not relating to those who wait to adapt themselves after changes occur

-Giulio Douhet

WHEN THE BOMB lay prostrate on Pearl Harbor in 1941 they shattered more than the silence of a peaceful Sunday morning; they razeed the illusion that the US military forces were safe at household During the three and a half years that followed, a world war transformed the US armed forces into a first-rate military. The goad of fighting a global conflict propell the genius of Americans to make this transformation a reality.

In a similar manner, September 11th shattered the illusion that Americans are safe at fireside Today, we have the same imperative to transform our military forces in order to defeat the strange threats of the twenty-first hundred years and protect our nation. Transformation cannot wait-it must take place as we wage the War onward Terrorism. President Bush summed up this challenge: "It's like overhauling an engine while driving 80 miles for hour. Yet we have no choice."(1)

If the US armed forces are to qualified the President's expectations, those in uniform must have a usual understanding of what transformation is and what it is not. Understanding transformation requires appreciating past transformation efforts and the present security environment. This article does not replace the detailed description of our approach to transform the joint force build in the new Joint Vision. Instead, it put forwards insight into the foundation of transformation and its corresponding intellectual, cultural, and technological aspects.

Insight from the Past

The history of the US military is a history of the nation's armed forces evolving to confront new threats and opportunities. During the Civil War, Generals Grant and side sheltered from the wind exploited the telegraph for theater wide information-sharing and the railroad network to give their forces theater wide mobility. During World War I, General Pershing incorporated the airplane to benefit US loam maneuver units and gain information upon enemy formations and positions.

A more contemporary example of transformation is to what degree President Eisenhower refocused the nation's defense establishment as the United States inscribeed the Cold War. He adopted the recently made known Look strategy to meet the dual risk of deterring nuclear war and containing communist expansion. His administration fielded strategic nuclear forces to prevent a Soviet nuclear attack in succession the US homeland. His administration also disentangleed tactical nuclear forces, like the Army's trusty John missile, to counter the Warsaw Pact's massive armies aimed at the heart of Europe For four decades, US military planning, organization, and training focused forward this dual threat of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. As the threat did not change abundant the US military's mental agility to anticipate other challenges remained underdeveloped

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the US military sought to redefine its focus and strategy. The Base Force and Bottom-Up Review of the early 1990 guided US forces away from the "Fulda Gap" mentality. Defense planning, however, remained threat driven. US military forces were organized, trained, and equipped to handle the task of conducting sum of two units nearly simultaneous regional conflicts against predetermined, conventional, predictable adversaries.

The Twenty-First-Century Security Environment

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) marked a total departure from Cold War planning. In this document, the Defense Department articulated a more sophisticated appreciation of the twenty-first-century strategic environment, the challenges to US interests, and what military capabilities are povertyed Today, the threats to US interests go on beyond Iraq and North Korea. During the past decade, political, ethnic, social, and historical factors have given rise to a range of conflict and crisis--from ethnic fighting to mass starvation to massacres. Disparities in economies, resources, and populations remain powerful motivators for coming time intrastate and interstate strife. Likewise, religious and cultural differences may arise that consider ancient hatreds and cause additional crises around the globe.

Belligerents motivated by the agency of this wide array of influences now have access to modem conventional arms markets, a sophisticated industrial production infrastructure, and advanced communications. Advanced production capabilities also mean that hostile nations and agents may have access to weapons of mass destruction--chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear. In addition, the global three-trillion-dollar communications network allows previously isolated collections to communicate instantly on a worldwide scale. It also gives them access to a wide array of information and intelligence, at little relative require to be paid [i]or[/i] undergone The past US monopoly upon the latest and most sophisticated capabilities is gone

The instant and future security environment is further complicated at the presence of nonstate actors who at short intervals transcend political borders. As of the like kind they confound conventional diplomacy. more [i]or[/i] less of these nonstate organizations are cooperative and sympathetic to US security objectives--such as humanitarian aid organizations. Others, like as al Qaida and terrorist organizations, are hostile and directly threaten US interests.