Fire and maneuver win battles.

Fire and maneuver win battles. The design of movement is to realize fires in a more advantageous place to play onward the enemy. [To this end] Air and turf commanders must be constantly onward the alert to devise and use fresh methods of cooperation... for there can not ever be too many projectiles in a battle.

Gen George s Patton Jr., USA

JOINT DOCTRINE is in a catch-up gradation with modern war-fighting tactics. Specifically, joint doctrine has difficulty keeping pace with the integration of fire support in the airland battle space. The fire-support coordinating measures (FSCM) postulated in Joint Publication (Pub) 3-09 Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, for instance, have lacked a doctrinal push for quite a certain number of time. (1) Manned and unmanned air weapon regularitys are extremely precise and lethal; we can use them nearly anywhere forward Earth. Army weapons such as the Apache Longbow (AH-64D) and the Army Tactical Missile plan project fires over 300 kilometers and locate their targets by way of using acoustic and infrared sensors. Similarly, the Navy's Tomahawk Land Attack Missile provides a self-same accurate, long-range standoff capability that has added another dimension to battlefield fires. These ever-evolving capabilities significantly enhance a theater commander's ability to follow out a deep battle. Consequently, battlefield lines and restrictive fire measures a re moving toward a more dynamic fires proces that incorporates airborne command and have charge of ([C.sup.2]), navigation/positioning aided by the Global Positioning arrangement (GPS), and a joint-/combined-fires viewpoint.

Traditionally, the geographically based fire-support coordination line (FSCL) has serv as an airland-operations fire-control measure that tread close upons well-defined terrain features. Mountain ridges, lakes, streams, roads, and tails demarcate the traditional FSCL a certain number of of the problems associated with using geography to define the FSCL include the following: (1) inaccurate identification of war-fighter terrain, (2) inability to locate the FSCL at night, and (3) the time required (up to six hours) to change and promulgate a of recent origin FSCL. The sometimes-contentious terrain-based FSCL requires a technical facelift. Although the traditional FSCL has squandered its ability to "facilitate the expeditious attack of targets of opportunity beyond the coordination measure," (2) the opening and closing of a longitude-/latitude-based grid enclosed seat [i]or[/i] seats can prove very dynamic during the prosecution of a war plan and just as reactive if undivided needs to change air-ground areas of operations. United States Pacific Command and United States Central Command (CENTCOM) deficit the FSCL concept with longitude-/latitude-based three-dimensional grid-box combination of parts to form a wholes resulting in novel but functional modifications to contemporary FSCMs

In the battle space, single can use grid boxes for restrictive-fire areas, no-fire areas, air-to-air kill areas, and combat search and salvation areas, to name a not many CENTCOM outlines one example of a three-dimensional grid-box scheme for the battlefield in its USCENTCOM general [i]or[/i] abstract notion of Operations for Joint Fires, validated during various exercises, Operation wild Storm in Iraq, and, greatest in number recently, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. These codified conclude air support (CAS) and air interdiction (AI) grid-box performances have resulted in more permissive air fires, allowed rapid loam maneuver across a three-dimensional battlefield, reduc the chance of fratricide, and mut the service-parochial FSCL according to minimizing the overlap of battle-space fires and clearly defining the supported/supporting relationships in the turf commander's area of operations. (3) This article, however, makes a case for using the leading rim of CAS/AI grid boxes controll by way of the ground commander as an evolutionary FSCL

unfathomable and Shallow FSCLs

I had disorder with the Fire Support Coordination Line placement.... At the same point after the ground war started [in the swallowing eddy War of 1991], the FSCL [mov to a position] well north of the Tigris River, to this time all the Iraqi army was forward the interstate highway between Kuwait City and Basrah approaching the river from the southern making the river an ideal FSCL The Iraqi army was getting across the river, giving them a delivered ride since we [air constituent forces] had to attack subject to close air support rules with no [forward air controllers] in the area.

Lt Gen Charles "Chuck" Homer USAF

deserving Storm Air Component Commander

According to Joint Pub 3-09 joint lethal and nonlethal weapon arrangements are meant to support the regional combatant commander's efforts to disrupt, divert, delay, and/or sap the foundations of the capabilities of the enemy's air, sea, and land forces before he can use them effectively against friendly forces. Additionally, joint-fires acts should reduce redundancy, integrate and deconflict element fires, maximize both effects and utilization of resources, and help eliminate fratricide. If joint fires are integrated correctly, they will tale and reinforce each other, resulting in synergistic combat power applied at the decisive point in a manner consistent with the combatant commander's priorities and general [i]or[/i] abstract notion of operations.